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I. INTRODUCTION
This evaluation study was conducted during October 1980 in 
the Dominican Republic by PADCO under the auspices of the Office 
of Housing and the Office of Foreign Disaster Relief Assistance 
of the Agency for International Development. The evaluation 
report presents an overview of the disaster relief response in 
housing in the Dominican Republic following Hurricane David in 
August 1979.
The study team was led by Lee Baker of PADCO. Joseph E. 
Arington, PADCO Vice President, and Mr. Harry Birnholz of DS/H 
also participated in carrying out the evaluation study.
While an initial part of USAID/DR post-hurricane efforts 
were conceptualized in terms of the 1976 USAID/Guatemala 
Materials Distribution Program following the 1976 earthquake, the 
total efforts of both USAID and the public and private sector 
were not significantly tied in to an adoption of the Guatemalan 
basic approach but rather included a variety of approaches 
largely carried out based on a perception of the distinct nature 
of the Dominican situation. In that light, and given the limited 
time provided for the present evaluation, the PADCO team decided 
to treat the evaluation of the post-disaster efforts in the 
Dominican Republic in terms of the "learning process" which took 
place as both the public and private sector attempted to respond 
to the emergency.
In addition to the wealth of information provided by the 
Program Manager and Acting Program Manager, the conclusions and 
recommendations reached concerning the total reconstruction 
program in Dominica are based on a series of field visits to the 
service agencies and interviews with informed individuals in 
affected areas. Observations, comments and opinions on the 
operation of the program and its impact were elicited from 
various sources. These sources include: the service agency 
staffs, residents of the rural areas who were and were not 
benefited by the program; officials from government ministries 
(mosf particularlv the National Housing Institute -- INVI); 
social service agency personnel knowledgeable about the program; 
and members of religious groups who had contact with the 
program. Also, USAID permanent staff were interviewed in the 
Dominican Republic and Washington in an attempt to understand not 
only the emergency reconstruction program, but also the overall 
planning and coordination that went into the entire disaster 
relief effort in housing.
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II. THE IMPACT OF HURRICANE DAVID AND
TROPICAL STORM FREDERICK
Hurricane David penetrated the Dominican territory on the 
afternoon of August 31 on the southeastern side of the island in 
an area located between the small communities of Nizao and Sabana 
Grande de Palenque on a line which almost divides San Cristobal 
and Peravia Provinces. Its winds were estimated at 120 
kilometers per hour within an 80 kilometer radius of the eye of 
the hurricane. Gusts of wind were estimated at about 240 kph.
Its effects were felt over a width of 400 kilometers wide and 
provoked over 400 milimeters of rain. Although as it penetrated 
the Dominican Republic it was losing force, especially in passing 
then hitting the central highlands area, its effects were 
devastating causing major loss of human life and destroying 
agriculture, housing and schools and other public and private 
buildings, as well as infrastructure and services.
Five days later, Tropical Storm Frederick entered the 
island, roughly at a point and trajectory similar to David. 
Frederick’s winds were as high as 75 kph. The additional 250-400 
mm of rain which it brought fell on already saturated land 
causing serious flooding and corresponding destruction of 
bridges, roads, drainage systems, dams and irrigation systems as 
well as hydroelectric plants.
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Between the 19th of August and the 2nd of September, in some 
areas over 700 mm of rain fell, approximately 50 percent of the 
normal annual rainfall for the Republic.
Beyond the loss of human lives, David and Frederick caused 
grave damage to the productive sector.The disasters occurred just 
as notable improvements were being observed in the rate of 
economic growth which gave signs of emerging from a prolonged 
period of stagnation which dated from the mid-1960Ts. The areas 
of the country which suffered the most damage were the southwest 
and south and north central regions. The provinces of San 
Cristobal and Peravia were among those hardest hit (see Map 1 for 
a graphic illustration of the damages caused by David and 
Frederick). The estimates of. damage indicated:
(l) Damage and Effects on the Population
• 2,000 deaths and thousands of injured.
• Approximately 100,000 families homeless.
• economic disarticulation and destruction which 
stimulated the migration of many residents to the 
fringes of Santo Domingo and other large cities in 
search of work, thus increasing an already 
critical urban-rural migration.
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(2) Material Damage and Overall Loss to the Economy
• Agr icultural damage was calculated at 354 million 
pesos, or 37 percent of total losses with great 
destruction of plantation crops and irrigation 
systems. Approximately four years will be 
required to recover pre-hurricane production 
l e v e l s .
• Hou s i ng losses were estimated at over 80 million 
pesos; an estimated 100,000 houses were affected, 
especially in the loss of roof structures. Some 
of the most affected zones include part of the 
National District, the Provinces of San Cristobal 
and Peravia, San Jose de Ocoa, Padre Las Casas, 
San Juan de la Maguana, Santiago and the Province 
of La Vega.
• Basic infrastructure losses including irrigation
systems, hydroelectric plants and distribution 
systems, roads, energy sources and communications 
were estimated at more than 100 million pesos.
• Education was affected both directly and
indirectly by the disaster. An estimated 15,750 
classrooms were damaged (85 percent of the total 
in the affected area). After the disaster, many
schools were utilized as refugee areas after the 
storms, thus further affecting the normal 
educational processes.
• Health facilities in the affected area received 
moderate damage whose repair was estimated at 
RD$1.6 million.
• Industrial losses were estimated at RD$85 million, 
with over 200 specific industries reporting heavy 
damage both in installations as well as prime 
materials. Furthermore, industrial production 
remained paralized for over two months causing 
losses estimated at RD$75 million.
• Commerce suffered considerable damage throughout 
the zone. An estimated 75 percent of the total 
losses of about RD$20 million corresponded to loss 
of existing inventories.
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III. THE RESPONSE OF THE GOVERNMENT OF
THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC
Immediately after the hurricanes, the Government of the 
Dominican Republic (GODR) took steps to focus and coordinate the 
emergency relief and assistance efforts of local, national and 
international agencies -- public and private -- in the areas of 
food, clothing, medicine, etc. The Instituto Nacional de la 
Vivienda (INVI) was made responsible for emergency efforts in the 
hous i ng sector.
The immediate actions of INVI were guided by the following 
criteria:
(1) Reconstruction efforts were to be a joint 
responsibility of both private and public sectors. The 
government efforts should be directly related to and coordinated 
with the efforts of the affected communities and their
ins t i tut i ons.
(2) Reconstruction efforts should be carried out 
simultaneously with ongoing productive activities.
* The scope of this evaluation report is limited to efforts 
within the housing sector.
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(3) Reconstruction should be carried out as part of 
long-term national upgrading and development activities.
The following requirements were established with respect to 
the participation of affected households:
(1) Have suffered the total or partial destruction of 
their house or dwelling unit.
(2) Lack of economic resources with which to 
reconstruct their houses.
(3) Willingness to contribute materials and self help 
in the reconstruction of their house. (
Within the context of national emergency efforts, INVI 
identified four action programs which were to take place in two 
stages: Stage I -- The Emergency Stage during which work was to 
be focused on repairing roofs and minor damage which would serve 
to make housing habitable for affected families; and Stage II 
The Reconstruction Stage which would consist of efforts to 
construct or reconstruct housing for refugees located in special 
facilities (see Figure 1 for a summary description of the 
s tages).
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A. STAGE I: EMERGENCY EFFORTS
1. Program 1: Repair of Roofs and Minor Damage
Building damage was categorized in two ways: damaged or
destroyed. A large majority of the first category consisted of 
damaged roofs and broken walls. The repair of damaged housing 
was irrmediately confronted with a materials supply problem (zinc 
and asbestos cement sheets, wood and nails).
As a basic objective for this work, INVI proposed to (1) 
rehabilitate a minimum section of each house in order to make it 
habitable; (2) offer employment to the large quantity of people 
whose economic activities were paralyzed; and (3) try to recover 
and make maximum utilization of the materials from previous 
housing which was damaged or destroyed.
A summary of the results of this program shows the
foilowi ng:
• The majority of the work was concentrated in three of
the most affected areas: the National District and the
Provinces of San Cristobal and Peravia which were 
divided into 20 zones attended by 1,038 special work 
brigades organized by INVI.
• A total of 12,500 houses were repaired and distributed 
as foilows:
-- 4,000 in Santo Domingo
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-- 3 , 200 in Ha ina 
-- 5,700 in San Cristobal 
-- 6 , 000 in Ban i
• The total investment in this Stage I program was 
RD$700,000 (see tables).
In carrying out this first stage program, INVI recruited and 
made extensive use of the available human resource pool, both 
technical and non-technical. The human resources employed 
included: 150 persons from INVI (the total INVI personnel);
1,557 contracted laborers (master builders and helpers for the 
brigades), as well as technical resources from a variety of 
private and public institutions -- Public Works (SEOPC); the 
College of Architects and Engineers (CODIA); the University of 
Santo Domingo (USAD); the Office of Community Development (ODC); 
the National Housing Bank (BNV); the Institute of Assistance and 
Housing (INAVI); and National Lands (BN). A total of 125 
technical personnel were utilized in addition to the residents of 
areas to be served. The total participation of community 
residents was estimated at 28,350 persons by INVI. All of these 
resources were organized into the previously mentioned 1,038 work 
brigades which were distributed as follows: San Cristobal 330
brigades; Santo Domingo -- 330 brigades; Haina -- 230 brigades; 
and Bani -- 230 brigades.
INVI estimates that the program generated approximately 
3,100 man-months of employment which somewhat alleviated the 
economic dislocation caused by the disaster.
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B. STAGE 11: RECONSTRUCTION
In November 1979, the second stage of reconstruction 
began. This was directed at the reconstruction of existing 
housing and the construction of new housing and included three 
additional programs:
2. Reconstruction of housing and repair of major damage.
3. Construction of row housing (barracks) for refugees.
4. Construction of housing and community development 
activities.
These programs were organized and executed by a special 
purpose unit set up within INVI (Unidad de Emergencia).
1. Program 2: Reconstruction and Repair of Major Damage
The principal objective of this program was directed at the 
relocation and rehousing of refugees still located in schools, 
hospitals and other non-housing facilities. The basic elements 
or sub-programs included: (1) structural repairs of housing in
precarious and dangerous conditions; (2) reconstruction of walls, 
roofs and partitions; and (3) construction of new housing. Under 
this program, a total of 23,794 solutions were developed.
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2. Program 3: Row Housing (Barracks)
The principal objective of this program was to relocate 
refugees living in public facilities, who were not property 
owners, by providing a series of barracks housing (see 
drawing). The program was carried out in Santo Domingo, San 
Cristobal, Haina, Bani and San Juan de la Maguana. A total of 
2,478 units were constructed.
3. Program 4: Reconstruction and Development
After the hurricane, a great number of national and foreign 
private non-profit institutions offered their assistance to 
INVI. Their efforts were focused through this program which took 
as its principal objective the construction or reconstruction of 
small population clusters or towns on the basis of integrated 
development activities in housing and socia 1-economic and 
community development.
INVI signed working agreements with the following groups:
• Christian Disaster Relief and the Dominican Red Cross.
• Comite Pro Ayuda Bani and Care (2).
• Comite Pro Reconstruction de Juan Baron and the
Mennonite Central Committee.
• Junta Pro Desarollo de San Jose de Ocoa.
• Comite Pro Ayuda de Bani.
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In these efforts, work was carried out jointly by the 
private non-profit groups, INVI and the community to be served.
A total of 1,922 houses were constructed or reconstructed under 
this program -- 1,586 in the Province of Peravia and 336 in San 
Cr i s tobal.
C. COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION AND INSTITUTIONAL
DEVELOPMENT
The donations of work, materials and most importantly the 
contribution and participation.of the refugee families themselves 
was critical to INVI's reconstruction task. INVI estimates that 
a total of 28,350 person-days of labor with a value of $2,800,000 
were constructed by community groups and individuals. An 
additional RD$5,000,000 in materials was contributed by community 
groups. Beyond that, of course, are the benefits, both short- 
and long-term, of the community self-help programs which can now 
provide the bases for other productive activities.
As INVIT s efforts developed during the first and second 
stages of work, an inter-institutional group representing both 
the public and private sectors was formed under its leadership to 
coordinate reconstruction efforts, share information and 
generally come to terms with the need for a long-term effort in 
housing for low income families, particularly rural. This group 
-- the Comision Interinstituciona1 de las Viviendas (CII- 
Viviendas) now has permanent status and has the following
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functions: (1) discuss and establish mechanisms which are
responsive to the demand for low income housing; (2) develop 
integrated housing programs linked wherever possible to 
productive educational and community development activities; and 
(3) develop and share information on funding, technology and 
procedures and methodologies which are relevant to the above- 
mentioned functions.
The following institutions are founding members of the CII- 
Viviendas: INVI; Public Works and Communications (SEOP); the
Community Development Office (ODC); the Central Bank; the 
Dominican Agrarian Institute (IAD); the Dominican College of 
Architects and Engineers; the Dominican Development Foundation 
(DDF); Social Services of Dominican Churches (SSID); the San Jose 
Foundation; CARE; Catholic Relief Service (CRS); the Association 
for the Development of San Jose de Ocoa; the Office of 
Construction for North Bani; and Caritas of the Dominican 
Repub 1i c.
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IV. AID HOUSING RELIEF RESPONSE
AID'S Emergency Housing Disaster Relief Program evolved 
generally from its initial conceptualization in October-November 
1979. Based on a rapid analysis of the existing needs and the 
GODR response in Housing, the USAID/DR initially decided to 
channel housing repair grants through six Private Voluntary 
Organizations (PVO's). A total of $538,000 was spent on 1,963 
solutions under the PVO program. Later, the program expanded by 
initially channeling home repair grant funds through INVI 
($326,500 during July-August 1980). Finally in its last stage 
funds were granted to INVI to construct a basic low cost core 
unit ($1,420,000 in September 1980). Figure 2 illustrates the 
chronological development of AID'S Emergency Housing Program.
The Program's gradual development over a full year presents 
certain difficulties with respect to evaluation, especially since 
the INVI portion of the program is just becoming operational as 
of October 1980. As of September 30, 1980, less than 30 percent 
of total budgeted program funds had been disbursed. For these 
reasons, the bulk of the present evaluation concentrates on the 
AID/PVO Emergency Housing Program. A brief description will also 
be presented for the INVI component of the program.
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FIGURE 2
USAID Emergency Housing D i s a s t e r  R e l i e f  Funds
Agency
Budgeted D isbursed  Houses to  be Houses R e p a i r /R e c o n s t r u c t io n
Amount Amount Repai red/Reconst  ru c ted  Repai red/Reconst  ruc ted_________ in P ro ce ss_______
CARE 5 130,000 $130,000 595 595 0
S e r v i c io  Socia l 
de I g l e s i a s  
Dcminicanos, Inc. 
( SS1D) 129,000 129,000 355 355 0
Southern  B a p t i s t  
M ission  of the 
Dcminican Ke- 
p u b l i  c 3,000 3,000 22 22 0
American I n s t ,  
f o r  F ree  Labor 
Development 
(AIFLD) 50,000 50,000 430 430 0-
Dcminican Devel­
opment Foundation  
(DDF) 150,000 135,000 477* 438 39
C a t h o l i c  R e l i e f  
S e rv ice  (CRS) 76,000 50,000 84 20 64
I n s t i t u t o  Nacional 
de l a  Vivienda 
( INVI) 290 ,0 00 1 108,000 873 151 N .A .
Inst  i tu t  o Nacional 
de la  Vivienda 3 6 .5002 36,500 N.A. N .A . N .A .
Inst  i t u t o  Naci onal 
de l a  Vivienda 1,420,000 0 930 0 0
TOTAL 52,284,500 5641,500 3,766 2,011 103
NOTES:
1 T h is  budgeted  amount of S290.000 tn c lu d e s  570,000 O u c h  i s  the  es t im ated  v a lu e  
and 7 ,000 fe e t  of r i d g e  r o l l s  donated  in  k ind  to  1NV1.
2 T h is  budgeted  amount of 536,500 i s  th e  e s t im a te d  v a lu e  of 50,000 pounds of nai 
SOURCE:
PADCO E la b o ra t io n  of USAlD/Dominican R epublic  S t a t i s t i c s .
of 20,000 s h e e t s  of roo fin g  
I s  donated  in  k ind  to  1NVI.
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A. CONTEXT FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF AID'S
EMERGENCY HOUSING PROGRAM
In order to understand the how and the why of AID'S 
Emergency Housing Program, the Mission's shelter relief response 
to Hurricane David and Tropical Storm Frederick must be placed 
within the context of the development of its overall disaster 
relief effort. The AID Mission began to anticipate the 
destructive potential of David and began to organize its overall 
disaster relief program four to five days before David struck the 
Dominican Republic on August 29, 1979. The initial emphasis was 
on the availability of foodstuffs. An inventory of available 
commodities was undertaken by the Mission's Disaster Relief 
Officer.
After an initial period of two to three days following the 
hurricane, during which time it was difficult to assess the full 
impact of David due to an almost complete breakdown in 
communication with the affected areas, the GODR Ministry of 
Defense convened a meeting of appropriate organizations on 
September 3, 1979 (GODR ministries, Civil Defense, AID Disaster 
Area Survey Team (DAST), etc.) to assess the damage caused by the 
hurricane. The following sectors were considered of priority 
concern for the initial disaster relief efforts:
• Health concerns relating to the drinking of 
contaminated water and to wind caused injuries; •
• The availability of foodstuffs;
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• The disruption in the affected area’s transportation 
and communication networks (roadways, bridges, 
telephone links, ports, etc.).
While the Mission’s DAST team was in the process of 
assessing the wind damage caused by David through the use of up 
to 19 helicopters, Tropical Storm Frederick hit the island on 
September 6th. Rapidly becoming aware of the extent of wind and 
flooding damage caused by the two tropical storms, the Mission 
changed its focus from one of damage assessment to immediate 
disaster relief. Much relief assistance in the form of food, 
clothing and medical supplies was subsequently airlifted into the 
affected areas. The Ambassador's $25,000 Special Fund was 
promptly allocated for emergency disaster relief.
Within 48 hours after Frederick had crossed the island, it 
became apparent to those reporting in from the affected areas 
that a lack of adequate shelter was a major concern. At the same 
time, offers of shelter assistance from many different PVO’s in 
the United States were pouring into the country. The Mission 
Director channeled this relief aid (in the form of roofing 
materials, roles of plastic, etc.) over to the appropriate PVO or 
government agency for distribution. The Mission also contacted 
the AID Disaster Relief Office (OFDA) in Washington to place an 
order for tents, generators and other immediate needs. Over 300 
tents, including flies, were delivered to the Dominican Republic; 
these, in turn, were distributed by the Dominican Army and the 
Peace Corps to the neediest families.
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As the Mission's immediate shelter relief efforts were
winding down in late September and early October, it became 
apparent (from discussions with INVI and the PVO’s with whom AID 
was working on food distribution programs) that an additional 
medium-term emergency reconstruction program was required in the 
areas most affected by David and Frederick.
In early October, word came from Washington that an amount 
of supplemental disaster funds would be made available by the 
U.S. Congress to assist in the reconstruction effort. An amount 
of $21 million was initially discussed, with $15 million 
eventually becoming available. This $15 million was to be 
allocated in the following manner:
• $7 million, for the repair of energy generating 
f a c i l i t i e s ;
• $5 million for the restoration of the transportation 
and communication network;
• $3 million for food, assistance to small farmers and 
housing.
The AID Mission, in conjunction with short-term consultants, 
moved rapidly to identify the medium-term (1-2 years) emergency 
shelter needs, as well as to evaluate alternative means of 
channeling assistance and grant funds.
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In this regard, AID made contact in early October with the 
Banco Nacional de la Vivienda (BNV) and the Instituto Nacional de 
la Vivienda (INVI) concerning potential disaster reconstruction 
working relationships. By this time, INVI was already well into 
its own Emergency Repair Program (based on construction brigades) 
in most of the affected areas including Santo Domingo. BNV had 
decided to take no direct role in disaster relief or 
reconstruction. Based on the massive organizational efforts 
required of INVI in its own emergency program, both INVI and AID 
concluded that the additional administrative and organizational 
inputs demanded from an AID financed program on the part of INVI 
were not feasible at that time.
However, based on estimated needs, INVI proposed that AID 
institute a comprehensive shelter relief program of its own which 
would include urban repair assistance in the form of 15,000 
housing repair kits, including zinc roofing panels, lumber, 
cement and nails. The total cost of each package was estimated 
at RD$150, including RD$17 for labor. In the rural areas, INVI 
proposed that AID consider financing 8,000 packages at an 
estimated cost of RD$125 per package, including RD$12 for labor.
In addition, discussions were held concerning the financing 
of 3 , 000 multi-family "barracks" housing (barracones ) . Finally, 
INVI discussed the need to finance 2,000 new core houses in rural 
areas at an estimated cost of RD$1,500 each. INVI envisaged the 
complete urban/rural housing reconstruction program would cost 
approximately RD$8 million.
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During these discussions with INVI and as a result of its 
frequent contacts with local PVO's, AIDTs policy and objectives 
with respect to an emergency housing reconstruction program began 
to evolve. Tempered by these discussions and the fact that,the 
Mission did not have a large quantity of grant funds with which 
to work, the Mission decided to work in the rural areas most 
affected by the tropical storms and to finance a building 
materials repair package instead of constructing finished low 
cost units. Since it was agreed initially that INVI was not 
prepared to take on the added burden of an AID program, ‘AID 
turned to the PVO’s with whom they already had developed an 
excellent working relationship based on the emergency food 
distribution program. The PVO’s were well-established in the 
affected rural areas. They were working closely on disaster 
relief efforts with community based organizations which were 
either set up by them or with whom they were working in 
affiliation. The PVO's knowledge of the affected rural areas met 
AID’S geographic and sectoral criteria. The following six PVO's 
agreed to work with AID on its Emergency Housing Program:
• CARE;
• Servicio Social de Iglesias Dominicanas, Inc. (SSID);
• Southern Baptist Mission of the Dominican Republic;
• American Institute for Free Labor Development (AIFLD);
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Dominican Development Foundation (DDF);
Catholic Relief Service (CRS).
In selecting the PVO' s through which to channel its funds 
for an Emergency Housing Program, AID felt it was obtaining a 
very reputable and accountable implementation instrument which 
would require little of its own efforts in establishing the 
vehicle for the distribution of building materials in the 
affected areas. This provided AID with an administrative 
structure that had access, through ongoing food and clothing 
relief programs, as well as trained staff, to reach the rural 
poor where disaster had struck the hardest.
Had AID chosen to go through organizations with whom they 
had had little previous experience, a greater amount of AID staff 
time would have been required to administer and monitor the 
program. Furthermore, AID recognized that each of the selected 
PVO’s had well-established internal auditing procedures which 
would potentially permit further increased rapid and effective 
action in the channeling and utilization of grant funds. This 
would permit AID to maintain financial control over program funds 
without having to impose outside monitoring controls over these 
relatively small organizations. Within broad program guidelines, 
AID allowed each PVO to develop its part of the emergency program 
on the basis of its own operating procedures and by-laws.
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B. PROGRAM POLICIES AND OBJECTIVES
1. Goa 1
The implicit goal of the AID Emergency Housing Program was 
to work through six PVO's in order to repair and rebuild dwelling 
units in the areas most affected by Hurricane David. The Program 
was organized in order to solve a perceived serious health and 
refugee problem. It was felt that the affected households 
required substantial and immediate assistance if continued 
suffering and large-scale rural-urban migration were to be 
avoided. It was envisaged that channeling assistance through the 
PVO's would have, through their contacts with community 
organizations, special outreach capabilities, particularly in 
rura1 areas.
This goal of channeling funds through the six PVO's has been 
essentially achieved in the initial $538,000 phase of the 
program. With the exception of 102 housing solutions in the 
process of completion (out of a total figure of 1,963 solutions), 
including the 64 core units in the CRS Arroyo Canas project, the 
first phase of the housing repair program has been completed as 
of September 30, 1980.
As mentioned in the introduction to the present section, the 
organizational vehicle for the implementation of AID’S program 
has evolved greatly during the program's first year. During the 
implementation of the $538,000 first phase from late November
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1979 through June-July 1980, the relatively slow disbursement of 
AID grant funds facilitated the use of the PVO’s as the program's 
implementing agents. During this period, INVI was undergoing 
substantial institutional changes. A new director and sub­
director were in the process of refocusing INVI's housing policy 
from one of producing middle income housing to one of 
coordinating the production of and producing appropriate low 
income housing solutions. In this capacity as the institution 
responsible for the coordination of low income housing 
production, an Inter-institutional Housing Commission was formed 
with INVI as its head. Many of the PVO’s already working with 
AID on its Emergency Housing Program (DDF, SSID, CARE and CRS) 
were also named as members of this commission. When large 
quantities of zinc roofing 'sheets, capping and construction nails 
became available to AID at the end of July 1980, it was decided 
to channel these materials and an additional $220,000 to 
complement and speed the materials use in the emergency repair 
efforts through INVI. This departure from previous Mission 
policy was based on the belief that the PVO’s who still wished to 
participate in AID’S program could not handle such a large 
quantity of materials and grant funds. The emerging position of 
INVI as the coordinating agency for all Dominican Republic low 
income housing activities also played a major role in AID s 
decision. When an additional $1.4 million became available in 
early September 1980 for the construction of new core housing 
solutions for low income households in the areas most affected by 
the tropical storms, it was only logical to channel these funds 
also through INVI.
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In summary, while the vehicle for the implementation of 
AIDrs Emergency Housing Program has evolved from the PVO’s to 
INVI during the first year of program implementation, the goal to 
repair and construct shelter solutions for those households most 
affected by the hurricane remained the same.
2. Purpose
The implicit purpose of the AID Emergency Housing Program 
was to work in coordination with six PVO’s to repair and rebuild 
rural homes destroyed or badly damaged by the tropical storms 
David and Frederick. Eighty percent of the affected dwellings 
were located in the countrv's southcentral provinces west of 
Santo Domingo. The PVO’s which participated in the program were, 
to a large extent, selected on the basis of their past "track 
record" of having established excellent working relationships 
with a wide range of community organizations based in the rural 
sectors of the areas most affected by the tropical storms. 
Reviewing the first year of program implementation, the PVO's 
have, in fact, performed their duties admirably. As of September 
30, 1980, $538,000 in AID grant funds have been disbursed. This 
figure represents over 1,950 families benefitted. Assuming six 
persons per family, the number of direct program beneficiaries 
approaches 12,000 persons.
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c. PROGRAM COMPONENTS
The evolution of AID’S Emergency Housing Program since its 
inception in late November 1979 can be roughly divided into three 
phases: (1) the AID/PVO Materials Package Phase; (2) the
AID/INVI Zinc and Nails In-kind Donation and Housing Repair 
Phase; and (3) the AID/INVI Basic Core House Construction 
Phase. Since the last two phases are just now in the early 
stages of implementation, this section will deal primarily with 
the evaluation of the AID/PVO program. A brief description of 
all three major phases will, however, be presented. Additional 
details concerning the characteristics of each of the individual 
PVO reconstruction efforts under the AID grant progrm are 
provided in Annex I.
1. AID/PVO Materials Package Program 
This component of AID'S Emergency Housing Program was 
designed to channel grant funds to six PVO’s in order to finance 
home repair activities in the hurricane affected area. How this 
program developed, with its corresponding goals and purposes, has 
been discussed in the previous two sections. Since AID respected 
the organizational and operational integrity of the six PVO s, 
there are slight variations with respect to the way each PVO 
developed its part of the program. The main focus of the present 
section is to give the specific details of how each PVO developed 
its own program. However, before embarking on the description of 
each individual program, it is possible to outline the broad
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general framework for this phase of AID'S Emergency Housing 
Program to which all PVO’s adherred.
The AID/PVO program involves the distribution of a building 
materials package through a subsidized sale delivery mechanism.
The program envisaged the purchase of a materials package and the 
payment of technical support and the payment of transportation 
and operating costs related to program development.
Transportation and operating costs were not to exceed 10 percent 
of the total cost of materials and technical support. The 
materials were distributed individually by each PVO through its 
affiliated network of service agencies in the affected areas.
The rural sections served by each service agency necessarily 
focus on the areas served by the AID program within the affedted 
zone. Each PVO signed an AID grant project agreement. After 
signing this agreement, the PVO was given an advance by AID to 
purchase a certain quantity of building materials. The materials 
package included wood for the damaged unit's structure and 
rafters, corrugated zinc roofing sheets and nails. Leeway was 
also given the PVO’s to purchase cement, concrete blocks and hand 
tools.
All materials were purchased locally by the individual 
PVO’s. The purchased materials were either transported to the 
PVO's Santo Domingo warehouse for later distribution (as in the 
case of CARE) or were distributed directly to the cooperating 
service agency. Materials were transported either by the local 
suppliers or by a local private transport firm.
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Community promotion and beneficiary selection are the 
responsibility of the PVO's field supervisor and the service 
agency manager. With the support of the community, each service 
agency was to undertake a survey of individual household needs. 
From this assessment, a master list indicating the potential 
beneficiary’s name, identity card number and estimate of 
materials required was assembled. Through a series of visits and 
discussions with the affected households and the service agency 
manager, the program’s beneficiaries were selected. With the 
exception of the service agencies working with SSID, all other 
service agencies chose the program beneficiaries from among their 
existing membership.
It was decided early in the program that the financial 
resources of the affected families was very limited. Therefore, 
the possibilities for short- or medium-term recovery of the 
materials costs were not good. Each service agency made an 
assessment of the repayment capacity of the program beneficiaries 
in its area. Most service agencies decided to collect a minimal 
initial quota of RD$10-20 for the materials package. On payment 
of this token sum, the entire package was handed over. Actual 
recovery of the outstanding balance has only recently begun to be 
organized at the level of the service agency. The percentage of 
total package cost to be recuperated will certainly vary greatly 
by service agency. It will probably range from a low of 
approximately 10 percent to a high of 50 percent. There exist 
strong doubts as to whether cost recovery will actually take 
place because of the time required to return to normal
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agricultural yields following the damages caused by David and 
Frederick in the rural zones.
Actual repair/construction will be the responsibility of the 
individual beneficiary. It was assumed by AID and the individual 
PVO's that the materials supplied under the program would not be 
sufficient to build a complete house. The package represented a 
starter kit by which the beneficiary could begin to rebuild his 
or her dwelling and which would complement materials salvaged 
from the previous dwelling or be complemented by materials 
purchased subsequent to the AID program.
Different incentives were used by the PVO's to induce the 
beneficiaries to erect a shelter with the materials package 
provided by AID. Some service agencies formed work brigades to 
assist in the repair program. Others provided technical 
assistance in the form of "maestros de obra'T to assist the 
beneficiaries and/or the work brigades in the reconstruction 
process. The "maestro de obra" generally provided assistance 
during difficult stages of construction (i.e., the laying of 
concrete blocks or the erecting of roof rafters) or in the case 
where the entire dwelling unit was destroyed he would provide 
direction in the design of the new structure (the timber post and 
rarrmed concrete exterior wall, tied together with barbed wire, 
seemed to be the preferred method of most "maestros"). It was 
also envisaged in many cases that the "maestro" would stimulate a
rapid utilization of the repair packages.
Funds collected from the beneficiaries through the sale of 
the materials packages were deposited in a bank account in a bank
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near the community. The use to be made of these funds was to be 
jointly decided by the service agency and the beneficiaries. It 
is envisaged that the funds will be used either for community 
projects or, more likely , for the purchase of additional 
building materials. With the exception of a few service 
agencies, very little money has been collected to date.
2. AID/INVI Zinc and Nails In-Kind Donation and 
Housing Repair Program
This phase of AID'S Emergency Housing Program included the 
donation of 20,000 sheets of galvanized zinc roofing, 7,000 feet 
of ridge roles and 50,000 pounds of nails to INVI. The estimated 
value of this in-kind donation totaled $106,500. With this 
material and an additional sum of $220,000 in AID grant funds,
INVI envisages being able to continue its housing reconstruction 
program in the rural zones of the Provinces of San Cristobal and 
Peravia. This phase contemplates the completion of several 
repair programs which, due to the severity of the damage, have
been stopped for lack of sufficient funds.
This program will assist in the repair of the houses of the 
neediest families in the affected rural areas. INVI and several 
PVO's will supervise the distribution of the building materials 
and the technical assistance support provided by the grant funds 
donated by AID.
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3. AID/INVI Basic Core House Construction
Program
This phase of AID’S Emergency Housing Program will provide a 
basic core shelter for the poor affected by Hurricanes David and 
Frederick who are still living in sub-standard housing.
Project activities will be undertaken in the Provinces of 
Azua, Peravia, San Cristobal and the western and northern 
portions of the National District, with the exception of Santo 
Domi ngo.
Based on AID experiences gained to date in its Emergency 
Housing Program, three minimal core house models have been 
selected for financing under the program. It has been agreed 
that the houses to be constructed with the funds donated by AID 
will cost up to RD$1,400 each, including latrines, materials, 
transport, skilled labor and INVI direct supervisory costs. The 
costs of the land, site preparation and water services will be 
borne by GODR. Self-help by the beneficiaries will be encouraged 
to the maxi mum degree.
It is expected that approximately 930 units will be built 
under this grant program of $1.4 million.
All houses, whether built on individual sites or in 
projects, will include latrines. In the case of projects, INVI 
will supply water to the program beneficiaries.
INVI has tentatively identified six communities for program 
activities. In five, there will be projects and in one a program 
of individual houses on scattered lots.
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The program will attempt to make maximum use of self-help 
participation in planning activities and in construction both to 
promote community identification with and support for the program 
and also to reduce costs. In addition, INVI will encourage the 
participation of PVO's for implementation of activities within 
the framework of the program.
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
In the Dominican Republic after the destruction of David and 
Frederick, a large gap existed between the actual damages and the 
donations and the relief and reconstruction of assistance 
agencies, the Government of the Dominican Republic, the private 
sector as well as the beneficiaries. The institutional response 
represented only a small portion of total need. Most 
significant, however, was the fact that abilities of the 
participating groups and agencies, international, national and 
local, grew considerably as a result of the experience. While 
the state of preparedness left something to be desired, it is 
also true that the rapid though rather hectic immediate 
mobilization of national human and financial resources committed 
to helping in the post-hurricane efforts provided the essential 
base for the progressive development of the systems needed 
provide more efficient utilization and coordination of all 
available resources. Over the year following the disaster, the 
technical and management ability and maturity of the 
institutions, their personnel and the community itself was 
greatly enhanced and developed extensively as a result of the 
post-hurricane relief and reconstruction processes.
Nevertheless, the experiences of this evaluation indicate 
that both the GODR and USAID should move rapidly to effectively 
build upon the knowledge gained through their recent experience 
in order to be better prepared in the future.
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A. LESSONS LEARNED THE GENERAL CONCLUSIONS
1. Policies and Objectives
(a) Needs Assessment. Immediately after the disaster 
in the Dominican Republic, there was a major need to develop a 
process for assessing the damage. INVI participated in the GODR 
assessment effort under the Emergency Committee organized by the 
President. A major role in the government's assessment was 
played by the National Statistics Office (ONE) which designed and 
implemented a census of population and housing in the Provinces 
of Peravi and San Cristobal in October and November 1979. In the 
private sector, individual PVO's working through their 
constituencies carried out rapid assessments of needs. The AID 
DAST Team also carried out a general visual field assessment of 
needs early on.
Despite these efforts, almost all immediate action 
programming was necessarily based on incomplete and sometimes 
unclear perceptions of the needs. Many well-meaning agencies and 
individuals were very quickly in the field trying to be 
"helpful," but without any immediate coordination of efforts 
based on a common perception of needs. Largely due to the lack 
of adequate prior preparation, very little consideration could be 
given to long-term needs in the period immediately following the
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disaster, or to a review of alternate approaches and the related 
processes involved in housing construction. Although the rapid 
involvement of the PVO’s in both public and private sector 
efforts did provide the firm basis for identifying the total 
needs of individual and community constituencies throughout the 
post emergency effort, initial estimates of damages often seemed 
quite exagerated.
The following conclusions seem appropriate:
(i) Surveys to determine need should be diagnostic and 
directed as much as possible to the specific needs of 
the individuals affected. This means that the number 
solutions must be viewed in terms of what it does from 
throughout its process of realization and should be 
related to and integrated with othr needs.
(ii) The major organizational and coordination effort 
required to get personnel mobilized to survey needs and 
tabulate information at the local level should be 
planned in advance in terms of the participants and 
their roles, the standard formats which are to be 
utilized, and transportation and logistics needs.
(iii) The requirement for centralized review and 
interpretation of needs must be balanced with those 
assessments and actions directed at localized needs.
In the Dominican Republic, this balance emerged through
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the eventual informal assignment of geographic areas of 
responsibility to both government agencies and PVO's. 
Eventually this constituency based approach tended to 
permeate all parts of the program and allowed for 
actions which went beyond the immediate housing needs 
to a concept of total community needs based on the 
unique characteristics and capacities of each 
community. Needless to say, in some cases however, 
assistance efforts by one or another agency emphasized 
particular aspects which corresponded to the assistance 
which the agency could provide.
(b) The Policy Framework. As the needs of the 
population became clarified in the Dominican Republic, a varietv 
of parameters affected the planning and implementation of 
disaster relief efforts in housing. Among the most important of 
these were: (a) the economic conditions of the country; (b) the
GODR disposition and development policies; (c) the ongoing GODR 
housing policies; (d) the normal ongoing decision making 
relationships; and (e) the key participants (personalities) and 
their relationships.
Since many of the decisions to be reached after Hurricane 
David and Tropical Storm Frederick were based on the 
establishment of communication between the victims and assistance 
agency personnel, as well as between them and government 
personnel, it is clear that the historical socio-political 
relationship between these groups was also quite important.
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Equally important was coordination between the various 
participants and the understanding cross-cultural understanding 
of the international donor agencies.
As the current national administration entered office in 
August 1978, the Dominican economy faced considerable 
difficulties. The GODR disposition and development policies 
prior to the hurricane were clearly oriented about the need to 
"retool" the national economy, increasing economic productivity 
while achieving a more equitable distribution of its benefits to 
the low income households (particularly the rural poor who had 
largely remained marginal to previous economic development 
e f f o r t s )  .
Within this context, the pos t-d i sas ter plans and acti'ons of 
the GODR were designed and directed to the development of a wide 
series of coordinated actions not only to promote the effective 
recovery of the affected zones of the country but also to include 
a series of initiatives which were directed at the medium and 
long-term economic and social development of such zones.
Thus, the development of a two-year National Investment 
Program for 1981 and 1982 (already underway when David struck) 
became a major focus for the identification of immediate 
investments and actions in the south-central region (the most 
affected zone) which would serve both immediate and long-term 
needs .
However, at the time of the hurricane, the GODR was steadily 
reviewing and reevaluating the role and the contribution of the 
construction sector to the economy. Primary emphasis for public
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sector housing investments was being placed on the need to make 
the limited government investment which was available more 
resonsive to the needs of low income households. No formal broad 
based national housing policy existed. Rather, INVI, the 
National Housing Institute, was attempting to complete 
construction of housing projects started by the previous 
administration while simultaneously beginning to formulate new 
plans and projects more in line with the GODR’s intention to 
increase the production of housing solutions which were more 
affordable for the lowest income levels.
In synopsis, while the basic parameters for GODR action in 
housing had been set, the development of the required technical, 
human, institutional and financial resources to support the 
emerging housing .policies was only at an incipient stage. Thus, 
also, the normal circumstances for the decision making in the 
housing production process were already in a state of flux at 
almost every level. Therefore, in the Dominican Republic, the 
post-hurricane relief and reconstruction efforts in housing were 
not unlike the task of trying to overhaul the transmission system 
of a race car during the brief pit stops in the middle of a major 
international gran prix race. No easy task.
The situation within the USAID Mission to the Dominican 
Republic was little different. A new Mission Director had only 
recently arrived in the country. The Mission did not have a
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long-term shelter strategy nor program prior to Hurricanes David
*and Frederick striking the Dominican Republic. During the post­
disaster efforts in housing, the nature of the disbursement 
schedule in separate tranches led to an evolution in emergency 
housing shelter solutions and the development of a rudimentary 
Mission housing strategy. The initial shelter activities towards 
which AID funds were directed were home repair packages. 
Irrmediately followng the disaster, AID'S priorities were focused 
on repairing damaged dwelling units in the affected areas. As 
new monies became available, AID began to view the emergency 
housing issue more in terms of a medium-term reconstruction 
program. They approved funding for PVO's to build basic core 
units in their target areas, as well as encouraging other PVO's 
to investigate the possibility of developing permanent shelter 
construction programs.
USAID/DR also requested the assistance of DS/H Washington in 
carrying out a Shelter Sector Assessment for the country in order 
to guide its future efforts in housing and urban and regional 
development. This work was completed in April 1980 and contained 
recommendations for AID'S continuing involvement with INVI and 
the PVO's.
Later, in mid-1980, when a larger tranch of grant funds 
became available for the Emergency Housing Program, the AID *
* Significantly, a newly assigned Housing and Urban Development 
officer arrived one week after the hurricane. A new Deputy 
Mission Director also arrived about the same time.
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Mission made the decision to channel these funds through INVI 
which at that time appeared to AID to be the only institution in 
the Dominican Republic with the administrative capacity in low 
income housing to absorb such a large sum. This change in the 
Mission’s Emergency Housing Program implementation vehicle will 
also provide it access to actively assist the GODR in developing 
long-term housing policy and programs for low income groups.
While the Mission did envisage that a drawn out disbursement 
schedule would develop under its Emergency Housing Program, it 
was able to take advantage of this situation in such a way as to 
permit its attitude towards shelter solutions to evolve with 
changes in circumstances and time.
With respect to the above policy framework parameters and 
the linkages achieved between agencies (local, national and 
international) and the post-disaster situation, it should be 
noted that both INVI and AID actively encouraged several PVO's to 
participate in housing programs despite the fact that they had no 
ongoing programs at the time in that sector. A key element here 
was the recognized need to develop effective linkages between 
beneficiaries and service agencies. However, from the standpoint 
of the PVO's, the results of the disaster relief program have 
been so encouraging that several of the PVO’s are now developing 
their own long-term shelter programs.
Under INVI’s leadership, an Inter institutional Commission 
(Cl I-Viviendas; see Section 2) emerged. Additionally, several of 
the PVO’s noted that AID'S insistance on developing a cost 
recovery component in the program has provided an unexpected
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source of funds to finance additional housing programs and/or 
other community development activities.
(c) Policy Criteria and Principles. Despite initial 
unpreparedness by major housing institutions -- public and 
private -- a number of issues were addressed over the post­
disaster period and formed the basis for the establishment of 
preliminary performance criteria for the Dominican Republic 
Housing Relief and Reconstruction Program. Some the more 
important issues included criteria and policy for (a) 
participation; (b) permanency; and (c) economic and financial.
Beneficiary participation became a very important issue 
immediately after the hurricane. The fullest possible 
participation of the affected communities and groups was 
considered from the outset as an essential part of almost all 
efforts. This positive stance with respect to the early 
involvement of the community was very clearly reflected in the 
prior public and private experience with community participation 
in the Dominican Republic and a recognition that the form and 
function of housing solutions along with other relief efforts 
should be based on beneficiary identified needs and an 
accommodation of existing living patterns.
The issue of permanency after the hurricanes reflected an 
ongoing dialogue among both public and private services agencies 
concerning housing needs and housing solutions. In one sense, 
the disaster measureably accelerated the process of thinking 
through and establishing an imp 1ementab 1e policy which was
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responsive to both expressed needs and the limited financial and 
technical resources which could be made available. The terms 
"emergency", "temporary", "permanent", "rehabilitation" and 
"reconstruction" etc. became programmatically real in terms of 
actual solutions and linkages among them. In that sense, the 
post-hurricane efforts of INVI, AID and the PVO’s represented a 
learn ing process.
The Brigades which INVI organized immediately following the 
disaster to assist affected individuals and families initially 
operated almost exclusively with the damaged materials which were 
scattered throughout the area. INVI officials contend that they 
became very aware of the need to have the community realize early 
on that the reconstruction efforts finally depended more on them 
than on the limited government resources which could be made 
ava i1able.
The provisional barracks housing which was put up after the 
hurricane in order to evacuate the refugee centers (schools and 
other public facilities) also provided INVI with a valuable 
lesson. The barracks housing, which was specifically designed to 
be provisional, immediately upon construction became permanent, 
despite all efforts to the contrary. The 2,478 units constructed 
in the second stage of INVITs total program are now requiring a 
reallocation of the number of rooms per family, added utility 
services and additional units constructed on the same site to 
make the original provisional housing more habitable. INVI now 
believes that the utilization of provisional housing for refugees 
located in public facilities must, if it is to be successful, be
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based on pre-planned, phased followup which gives prior 
consideration to anticipated modifications, or perhaps, provides 
even less permanent provisional housing (mu 11i-fami 1y tents) 
located on the sites where more permanent housing will be built.
The economi c criteria for housing relief and reconstruction 
efforts evolved throughout the year following the disaster.
Apart from the initial immediate action materials distribution 
efforts, there was a general concensus that the cost of housing 
solutions and the payment for the same must be at levels of 
economic feasibility for the low income victims. However, many 
difficulties were encountered due to the variety of sources of 
assistance which ultimately became available to the affected 
population and the tendency of households to "hold out for the 
best deal." Despite a myriad of problems, almost all efforts, 
both public and private, were continually directed at the need to 
assist in forms which do not reduce the dignity of individuals 
nor which encourage inaction or expectation of additional free 
ass i stance.
Furthermore, INVI made a major effort to utilize relief and 
reconstruction efforts in housing to aid the economic recovery of 
the community in which it was working. This was accomplished by 
maximizing the employment of unemployed individuals, the 
utilization of self-help labor.
2. Planning and Coordination
When Hurricane David struck the Dominican Republic, 
institutional mechanisms for the planning and coordination of
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normal housing production were in a state of change. Since the 
current government administration had been in office for only 
about a year, major institutional changes were still underway 
with respect to all areas and aspects of institutional 
development and coordination, particularly the planning and 
production of housing. While many public entities were willing 
and anxious to collaborate, intersectoral coordination was still 
at an incipient state. Furthermore, few formalized mechanisms 
existed for the coordination of public and private sector 
activities.
The increasing amounts of assistance available to assist the 
affected individuals and households after the hurricane had to 
deal with the lack of effective mechanisms and criteria for 
utilizing such assistance, especially in housing. There appear 
to have been minimal prior linkages between INVI and other 
disaster mechanisms such as Civil Defense and the military who 
have been traditionally responsible for pre- and post-ernergencv 
activities in the Dominican Republic. The administrative 
separation of the various components of the relief effort was 
therefore initially handled by a Presidential Committee 
consisting of those major relevant agencies who carry normal 
programs in housing and basic infrastructure and public 
services. Several false starts were made initially in the 
management and coordination of the supply and distribution of 
material assistance in accordance with need. Most participating 
groups found themselves subjected to an almost insurmountable 
amount of meetings focused on coordinating efforts in a situation
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where everyone wanted to be of assistance but few coordinating 
mechanisms existed. With respect to INVI, a change in the 
executive direction of INVI was made during the second month of 
emergency efforts when a new Director was appointed.
Likewise, as mentioned earlier, while USAID in the Dominican 
Republic was interested in providing assistance which would 
support a continuity of housing provisions, it did not have a 
housing development strategy and therefore also had to gain 
experience over the process of its post-disaster efforts.
For both the national and international agencies, the 
existence of numerous non-formalized activities played a 
significant role in their post hurricane activities. However, 
since very little planning for post-disaster processes had been 
carried out prior to Hurricane David, this potential was only 
discovered in the course of trying to recognize and respond 
effectively to the needs of the affected population. Extensive 
work needed to be done initially in becoming more familiar with 
the characteristics of available resources within the disaster 
area and the means in which such potential could be channeled 
within the existing housing production process.
Significantly, during the post-hurricane period, both USAID 
and INVI were able to identify human, technical and financial 
resources which are transferrable not only to the post hurricane 
situation implementation but also appropriate to direct 
conti n u ous application in the ongoing GODR housing activities. 
The Inter-institutiona1 Commission, composed of public agencies 
and PVO's, was organized by INVI. It represents an excellent
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example of a mechanism which served both the immediate needs as 
well as the countries continuing need to address the existing 
hou s i ng deficit.
The learning process between the post-hurricane and ongoing 
conditions is now an area that INVI wants to review in order to 
develop those aspects that may be applicable to the alleviation 
of the ongoing housing production crisis as well as to set the 
basis for future post-disaster actions which more fully utilize 
and develop the basic housing processes.
Pre-disaster planning and organization is important for two 
major reasons:
(1) The entire disaster relief effort (both short- and 
medium-term) must be seen as one comprehensive 
program. If the initial disaster relief effort is 
badly managed (poor timing, distribution, type of 
relief provided, target group selected, etc.) or if it 
is not seen as setting the basis for programs to 
follow, the medium-term program can be severely 
undermined in the eyes of local government officials 
and/or the households to be served by the program.
(2) Unless the approach and mechanisms for organizing a 
comprehensive disaster relief effort are well-planned 
in advance of the disaster, the timing of the medium- 
term relief can be affected greatly. (In the present
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case of the AID/Dominican Republic response to 
Hurricane David, while the decision to work directly 
with already operational PVO's greatly facilitated the 
rapid implementation of AIDTs program, it was 
approximately three months from the day of the 
hurricane until the first materials packages were being 
sold as part of AID'S program.)
3. Economics -- Financing and Cost Recovery 
The economics of the post-hurricane housing program in the 
Dominican Republic has potentially widespread impacts ranging 
from the cost of a housing solution to the beneficiary groups as 
well as the effects on the national economy. In actual 
experience, the resolution of these impacts was not the product 
of prior planning nor coordination, but rather depended on the 
specifics of each assistance agency's programs, the ways in which 
they procured and distributed materials, the solution involved, 
and the labor required to complete the solution. This lack of 
preparation probably resulted in the development of some 
solutions which, if considered in terms of the agencies total 
resource levels, would not be considered a wise use of the 
agency's resources. Frequently, the costs of materials was the 
prime determinant on the housing solution type and the other non­
material costs were disregarded. The inclusion of costs for the 
setting up of transportation, warehousing, construction tools and 
equipment, labor and supervision, training and general overhead
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were considered as part of the basic costs by each participating 
agency on an individual basis. No adequate prior review of the 
extent of such costs and their ultimate effect on the viability 
of the housing solutions carried out was possible.
Some cost savings resulted from basic public and private 
policy. For example, full recognition was given to the effective 
utilization of the extensive body of competent Dominican 
professionals and supervisors in both the public and private 
sectors whose services were an essential element of most every 
post-hurricane effort. This resulted in considerable savings in 
the cost of technical assistance while at the same time providing 
fully acculturated and knowledgeable technical and human 
resources.
Cost recovery and financing of housing solutions after the 
hurricane was perhaps the most important issue to the 
beneficiaries of relief and reconstruction efforts. There was a 
great deal of variety in both the philosophy and the mechanisms 
of cost recovery and repayment procedures. Some of the 
approaches utilized included: (a) the provision of construction
materials and the furnishing of supervisory and administrative 
assistance to a group of organized families who carried out self- 
help solutions; (b) the development of a subsidized materials 
program with the beneficiaries providing the labor; (c) money and 
building materials provided to a local organization which 
extended loans, with repayment going into a revolving fund 
utilized to finance community projects; and (d) the construction 
of houses and their delivery to recipients free of charge.
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Needless to say, the discrepancies and inconsistencies in 
approaches frequently led to confusion, uncertainty and even 
sometimes frustration on the part of beneficiary groups. As 
mentioned earlier, frequently the recipients would review several 
assistance sources, hoping to utilize the best and most economic 
offer. In many cases, where agencies provide emergency giveaway 
programs, they found it extremely difficult to end such 
efforts or make an orderly tansition into non-subsidized or 
partially subsidized schemes.
Clearly, in the Dominican Republic, many of these 
discrepancies occured because of lack of prior preparation.
Almost uniformly, the participating institutions (both public and 
private) were concerned about the need to strengthen individual 
and group self-reliance through some form of repayment and 
through full community participation in the development of the 
financing and cost recovery mechanisms. However, the lack of 
adequate prior planning and institutional coordination caused 
individual efforts to become complicated when neighboring relief 
and reconstruction efforts varied in the burden of 
responsibilities which they placed on the recipients.
There were many unresolved issues in the recent efforts 
which still need to be resolved by the participating agencies. 
What procedures should be followed when an agency does not want 
to recover its capital? The use of subsidized sales (as per the 
USAID effort) and the turning over of the collection effort to 
ongoing institutions needs further review and study based on the 
recent experiences. These and other issues have already been
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identified by INVI, USAID and the participating PVO’s and other 
government organizations as primary considerations in preparing 
for future natural disasters.
B. RECOMMEND AT IONS
1. Recommendations for Action by the GODR
In August of 1981, almost one year after Hurricane David 
struck, INVI, the prime government agency responsible for the 
relief and reconstruction efforts in housing, made several key 
recommendations to the Dominican government, its people and its 
institutions -- public and private. The majority of these 
recommendations suggested a broad initial framework for 
continuing the learning and development process in order to 
better prepare the country to both prevent as well as to prepare 
for future natural disasters. Among the important 
recommendations made by INVI, the PADCO Evaluation Team 
particularly recognizes and subscribes to the following:
(a) Create a National Disaster Preparedness Committee
responsible for the mobilization and coordination of 
the Dominican people and its institutions in order to 
evaluate the potential needs and plan for necessary 
preventive/preparedness actions as well as for the 
effective and efficient mobilization of post-disaster 
relief and reconstruction efforts in case of future 
natural disasters.
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(b) Establish a National Disaster Preparedness Policy with 
norms and guidelines for the prevention and prevision 
against disasters. This should include all stages from 
physical planning of human settlements to the 
construction norms and standards in order to relate 
construction systems relative to the risks which they 
face.
(c) Study the feasibility of establishing a system of 
refugee facilities for the adequate protection of the 
community in similar disaster situations.
(d) Finally, and most importantly, INVI has also suggested 
the development of a national seminar or forum under 
the auspices of the GODR in coordination with the 
private sector, to share the experiences of the 
distinct sectors which participated in the hurricane 
disaster and the subsequent reconstruction 
activities. It is anticipated that such a seminar will 
not only permit the proper evaluation of the post­
disaster efforts but will be directed at the initiation 
of a continuous institutional development process 
directed towards better preparing the Dominican 
Republic, its people and its institutions to confront 
future natural disasters or emergencies.
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2 . Recommendations for Actions bv USAID/DR
The AID Mission at the outset of the disaster relief effort 
made two very important managerial decisions. First, during the 
first few months following the hurricane, the responsibility for 
the development and management of shelter relief programs was 
handled through an informal group of AID Mission personnel. This 
decision permitted several direct hire staff to gain experience 
in disaster relief response, as well as to permit information 
coming from various sources to be shared by all persons dealing 
with the relief program.
As the initial emergency phase of the program was completed 
and the Mission began to develop a medium-term housing 
reconstruction strategy, responsibility for the program was 
assigned to a project manager who was responsible for dealing 
with a specific group of implementing agencies.
However, despite the obvious positive achievements of 
USAID/DR relief and reconstruction efforts in housing, many 
actions can now be taken which will facilitate greater efficiency 
and effectiveness of the Mission's post-disaster efforts in the 
future. The most important recommendations include:
(a) USAID/DR and OFDA should seek to provide every possible 
support to the efforts of INVI and the GODR to 
establish ongoing mechanisms for the effective 
evaluation of recent post-hurricane efforts and the 
development of effective mechanisms for planning and 
preparing for future natural disasters.
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(b) It is essential that AID/Dominican Republic develop and 
maintain a standing Disaster Preparedness Committee in 
order to be able to rapidly and efficiently organize 
the Mission’s short- (1-2 months) and medium-term (1-2 
years) disaster relief efforts. The committee would 
include AID personnel not only with a knowledge of 
shelter and housing, but also with expertise in the 
areas of food, sanitation, medical supplies and 
clothing. The committee would be staffed by 3-4 
permanent AID employees on the basis of their role 
within the mission (i.e., Director, Deputy Director, 
Disaster Relief Officer, Agricultural Officer, Housing 
Officer, etc.). This committee would be responsible 
for establishing the Mission’s policies and objectives 
with respect to disaster relief. It would be organized 
in such a way as to be able to provide both a rapid 
immediate response, as well as to immediately begin the 
preparations for AID’S medium-term response (emergencv 
reconstruction). The committee would have the capacity 
to make an initial damage assessment and to determine 
what emergency materials are immediately required.
(c) Due to the possibility of damage and transportation 
difficulties, it is not recommended that emergency 
materials be stockpiled in the Dominican Republic. 
Rather, after determining a range of materials which
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would be required in the event of a disaster, they 
would be stored in Puerto Rico, Panama or Southern 
Florida.
(d) A list of private contractors with security clearance 
should be on file with the Mission for immediate 
contact if their services were required for initial 
disaster relief. These same contractors would serve as 
an experienced pool of expertise which could be quickly 
called upon to begin to organize the more medium-term 
disaster response (in the case of Hurricane David, the 
Emergency Housing Program).
(e) The AID Mission, working in close coordination with 
SER/COM and OFDA in Washington, should have on file 
standard contracts and materials specifications for the 
purchase of any additional emergency materials (not 
available locally or stockpiled) required immediately 
after a disaster and for the rapid purchase (within the 
2-month OFDA relaxation of tender requirements) of 
materials required for the medium-term program.
In summary, it is essential that an AID Mission have a clear 
idea before a disaster strikes of how/why (policies and 
objectives), for whom (target population), when (timing) and with 
what (appropriate program) it plans to confront a disaster.
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(f) In future post-disaster efforts, it would be advisable 
for the Mission to contract a full-time PSC to monitor 
the program and to consider using a second contractor 
whose time would be spent exclusively in the field 
monitoring the progress of the repair and 
reconstruction program by the implementing agencies.
(g) In order to be able to use and build on the Dominican 
Republic disaster relief experience, greater 
documentation should be developed and maintained which 
helps to show the "how and the why" of setting up the 
AID Emergency Housing Program. For example, how was it 
decided initially to finance a building materials 
program and not a basic core solution? The choice of 
rural zones over urban areas? Why were the PVO’s 
selected for program implementation and not INVI? 
Immediately after the hurricane and during the first 
several field damage assessment trips, a brief but
we 11-documented program beneficiary survey would have 
been very useful. This type of user survey would have 
substantiated the type of assistance required for an 
emergency reconstruction program and the affected 
households ability to pay for the program.
(h) After having decided to work through the PVO's and 
allow them to organize the materials package program
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based on their own individual operational procedures 
and by-laws, each PVO's particular way of structuring 
its program with respect to selection of community 
groups with which to work, beneficiaries to be served, 
cost recovery mechanisms, use to be made of the 
recovered funds, etc. should have been placed in the 
grant project agreement.
(i) As part of future efforts, a separate filing system 
should be organized within the AID Mission to document 
the flow of funds from AID to the individual PVOTs, the 
purchase of materials by the PVO's, the acceptance of 
the materials by the rural community groups and the 
distribution of the materials to the program
bene f i c i ari es.
(j) Either AID or the individual PVO's should undertake, 
internal to the program, a bi-weekly or at a minimum a 
monthly audit of the disbursement of materials. Based 
on these audits, a monthly financial report should be 
submitted to AID by each PVO. At the end of the 
program, an external audit should be conducted of each 
PVO's participation in the program.
(k) In future disaster reconstruction programs organized to 
work through local PVO affiliates, careful thought 
should be given distribution criteria, particularly to
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the issue of only working with an associated group's 
membership affiliates.
(l) The capacity of the program beneficiaries to pay for an 
emergency housing program and the use to be made of the 
recovered funds should be thoroughly examined and 
documented in advance of program initiation.
(m) At the completion of a subsidized materials package 
relief program, an end use survey is very useful. How 
have the program beneficiaries used their materials? 
Have they been used, stored or resold? A quick random 
survey of perhaps ten households per service agency 
might be undertaken to verify these results.
(n) Greater emphasis should have been placed on 
coordinating the individual activities of those PVO's 
participating in AID'S Emergency Housing Program (i.e., 
exchange of information on program implementation, 
availability of technical support, procurement of 
materials, etc.).
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ANNEX 1
AID/PVO RECONSTRUCTION PROGRAM 
DESCRIPTION OF 
PVO PROGRAMS, AND PROJECTS*
1 . PVO: CARE
Grant Funds: $130,000
Policy Objectives:
CARE’s purpose was to initiate a rural housing 
distribution program. It developed a pilot project for the 
distribution of construction materials through a subsidized sales 
program which eventually would reach 3,000 families in the Bani 
and San Cristobal regions. This materials package versus a 
completed solution approach was adopted because of the limited 
funds available for shelter programs.
• Phase I: Granted $30,000 to repair 93 homes in El
Limonal, Province of Peravia. Worked with the Pro-Bani
This Annex is limited in scope to only those PVO programs and 
projects which were financed by AID. Many of these PVO’s had 
access to other sources of financing and therefore reached 
greater numbers of beneficiaries than described here.
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Committee. Repaired 60 homes in Sainagua and Malpaez. 
Province of San Cristobal working with FEDOCOOP.
• Phase 11: 'Additional grant of $50,000 to repair
additional 100 homes in Limonal and 125 in Sainagua- 
Malpaez. Downpayments of RD$10-20 collected in this phase.
• Phase III: Additional grant of $50,000 to expand
repair program to La Co Ionia (117 families) and San Jose de 
Ocoa (100 families). The construction of two model 
hurricane resistant core houses was also financed as part of 
this phase.
Organ i zat i on:
CARE became involved with the AID Emergency 
Housing Program through its food distribution program following 
Hurricane David. Because of a prior negative experience in 
housing, CARE/N.Y. was initially reluctant to go into housing. 
When it finally agreed to participate, and due to the limited 
availability of funds, it decided to focus its attention on 
repairing sound permanent structures. CARE distributed the 
materials packages through the field service agencies of the 
Committee Pro-Bani and FEDOCOOP.
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Planning and Coordination:
( J
• PIann i ng:
The initial planning revolved around the 
provision of materials and technical support for the repair 
of 153 homes. CARE did not initially envisage a cost 
recovery system. At the suggestion of AID, CARE decided to 
let the service agencies (Committee Pro-Bani and FEDOCOOP) 
be responsible for the collection of payments. A 20-30 
percent recovery policy was envisaged. CARE assigned two 
field supervisors to work with the service agencies to 
identify and train the service managers who would work with 
the community to prepare a master list of the needs of the 
affected families. From this master list the program 
beneficiaries would be selected. Bank accounts were opened 
for the deposit of funds accumulated from the sale of 
materials packages. CARE provided zinc, nails, wood and 
hand tools. It was reluctant to provide cement because of 
storage problems. CARE examined the needs of the 
beneficiaries in order to assemble a comprehensive package.
• Geographic Location;
El Limonal, Sainagua, Malpaez, La Colonia and 
San Jose de Ocoa.
• Bene f i c i ar i es :
595 homes repaired.
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• Service Agenc i es;
Committee Pro-Bani and FEDOCOOP.
• Extent i on i sts:
The two CARE field staff identified and 
selected service managers to oversee the repair program at 
the local level with assistance from the CARE staff.
• Training and Supervision:
CARETs regional coordinators were responsible 
for the training and monitoring of service managers. 
Training was undertaken during the daily work experience. 
CARE managers reviewed all materials requests and 
distribution lists. Initially the skilled labor support 
staff received no training, but during Phase II they did 
receive training in the CRS hurricane resistant house.
• Coord i nat i on:
In the El Limonal service area, CARE 
coordinated its repair efforts with the Office of Community 
Development (ODC). In most service areas, food for work 
programs were provided for the work brigades and the 
"maestros de obra.,T
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Program Financing and Accountability;
• Funding Source:
AID grant funds of $130,000.
• Costs Recovered;
To date RD$7,332 has been recovered and put 
back into the program. The program beneficiaries were 
charged RD$10-30 per package initially, with the remaining 
costs to be recovered by the service agencies.
• Requ i red Forms:
(1) List of potential beneficiaries; (2) 
master list of beneficiaries and their needs; (3) signed 
distribution forms and receipts of materials by program 
bene f i c i ar i es.
• Audits:
Bank accounts monitored by CARE. Field staff 
performed periodic audits of service manager’s activities. 
CARE submitted periodic reports to AID.
Program Implementation;
• Materials:
Purchased through local suppliers. Stored in 
CARE warehouse in Santo Domingo. Materials transported to 
service agencies either in CARE or private local truckers.
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• Service Agency Warehousing:
Dependent on availability; service managers 
responsible for receiving materials.
• D i s t r i b u t i o n :
Service manager and the community responsible 
for the distribution of materials to the program 
beneficiaries. Distributions timed to the availability of 
the work brigades.
• Materials Package:
Determined on the basis of a user needs
survey.
• Monitoring of Construction:
Skilled labor provided to assist the work
brigades.
2 .  p v o : Servicio Social de Iglesias Dominicanas (SSID)
Grant Funds: $129,000
Policy Objectives:
SSID’s stated purpose was to finance home 
repairs in the Municipio of Cambito. Province of San Cristobal
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in the villages of Altos de Pundun and Mucha Agua. SSID took the 
responsibility for the distribution of materials, as well as 
providing the necessary technical support and project 
supervision. SSID was initially interested in constructed 
completed units, but due to a lack of funds agreed to participate 
in the repair program.
Organ i zat i on :
SSID organized community groups at the 
grassroots level for the reconstruction effort.
Planning and Coordination:
• PIann i ng;
SSID conducted a house-by-house damage survey 
with the participation of the community in the exercise. 
Three carpenters were hired to assist the community's self- 
help efforts. A committee with the responsibility for the 
distribution of materials was formed in each project area. 
The entire community had the responsibility for the 
materials stored in its area.
• Geographic Location:
Province of San Cristobal, Mu n i c i p i o of 
Cambito, villages of Altos de Pundun and Mucha Agua.
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• Bene f i c i ar i es :
355 homes repaired.
• Training and Supervision:
Twenty foreign volunteers under the auspices 
of the World Council of Churches came in for 20 days to help 
in the community repair efforts. In addition, three 
carpenters were assigned to assist the organized work groups 
(one per 10 houses). They used the CRS technical manuals as 
they became available. SSID tried to organize a training 
workshop with the other AID/PVO's, but it did not work out 
due to a lack of coordination.
• Coord i nat i on:
Due to the isolation of the villages in which 
it worked, SSID was the only organization working in the 
area.
Program Financing and Accountability:
• Funding Source:
SSID has received $129,000 in grant funds from 
AID. These funds were disbursed in three phases of $29,000, 
$50,000 and $50,000, respectively.
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• Costs Recovered:
In Phase I of the program, RD$10-70 were 
collected per beneficiary. In Phase II, this amount was 
decreased to RD$10 per beneficiary. It was mutually decided 
between SSID and the service agencies that 50 percent of 
materials costs would be collected from the program 
beneficiaries over a period of 2-3 years depending on the 
harvest cycle. Beneficiaries were not initially informed of 
the 50 percent subsidy in order to make an accurate 
assessment of the basic repairs needed. The funds recovered 
are being held in a special bank account which will later be 
used for additional housing activities.
• Aud its:
SSID church representatives were responsible 
for keeping the accounts on the amount of materials 
purchased and subsequently distributed to the 
beneficiaries. The SSID Project Manager regularly reviewed 
the account books to maintain accuracy.
Program Implementation:
The implmentation strategy of SSID consists of 
the following elements:
1. Organize a reconstruction committee in the participating 
communities (formed from the community leaders);
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2. Undertake a field survey of the financial and technical 
requirements of the affected families;
3. Obtain adequate financing;
4. Distribute materials and provide technical assistance;
5. Organize repayment schedule of the program 
bene f i c i ar i es.
3. p v o : Southern Baptist Mission of the Dominican
Repub 1i c
Grant Funds: $3,000
Program Description:
A grant of $3,000 was donated to the Southern 
Baptist Mission to finance emergency home repairs activities 
already underway in the area south of the San Cristobal Highway 
between the Nigua River and La Posada. The funds were used for 
the purchase of construction materials. Related transportation 
costs will also be covered by the AID funds. Twenty housing 
units were constructed with the assistance of construction teams 
brought in from the U.S. on a voluntary basis.
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(AIFLD)
Grant Funds: $50,000
Policy Obj ec t i ves:
AIFLD worked through FENAC (?) to finance home 
repairs in Sabana Palenque, Azua, Jarabacoa, Dajabon and Yuna. 
Materials were distributed at subsidized rates. Initially, 2 2 5  
homes were to be repaired, but through careful damage assessment, 
430 homes were able to be repaired with the donated funds.
Organ izat i on:
AIFLD worked through FENAC, a Dominican rural 
agrarian cooperative, which they helped to organize eight years 
ago.
Planning and Coordination:
• PIann i ng:
AIFLD acts as the guarantor to AID that FENAC 
will execute the program as agreed. FENAC obtained the 
price quotations for the materials and then gave FENAC an 
advance for materials purchase. Upon proof of purchase, 
FENAC was given another advance. Areas and communities to 
be served decide jointly between AIFLD and FENAC. FENAC 
rented the transport and oversaw the delivery of materials
4. PVO: American Institute for Free Labor Development
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to the designated service agencies. All beneficiaries were 
FENAC members. Each beneficiary was required to sign a 
contract agreeing to repay 1/3 of the materials and 
transport costs. Materials were handed over after the 
payment of a token downpayment. The remainder was due at 
harvest. The recovered funds of $12,350 were put into a 
Rural Production and Marketing Credit account.
• Geograhic Location:
Sabana Palenque, Azua, Yuna, Dajabon and
Jarabacoa.
• Bene f i c i ar i es :
Program open to active members of FENAC only, 
but families were allowed to join in order to participate in 
the materials program. 430 homes were repaired.
• Training and Supervision:
In January 1979, AIFLD held two one-dav 
seminars with FENAC personnel concerning implementation of 
the program and the required documentation. A list of 
appropriate materials was prepared at this seminar.
• Coord i nat i on :
AIFLD provided overall operational review of
FENAC.
Program Financing and Accountability:
• Funding Source:
AID grant funds of $50,000
• Costs Recovered:
FENAC members agreed to repay 1/3 of the 
materials costs. $12,350 has been recovered to date. Part 
of the accumulated funds are to be used to purchase land for 
a FENAC Educational Center. RD$5,000 was used as a 
downpayment to purchase a truck for a marketing program and 
the remainder was deposited into the regular FENAC Credit 
Program to assist members before harvest.
• Aud its: N.A.
Program Implementation:
• Materials:
FENAC determined the quantity of materials 
required and purchased them from the supplier in Santo 
Domingo. Transport was hired and the materials were stored 
i n FENAC centers.
• Monitoring of Construction:
FENAC staff in each locality were responsible 
for the promotion and distribution of materials, as well as 
for monitoring the members work activities.
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PVO: Dominican Development Foundation (DDF)5 .
Grant Funds: $150,000
Policy Objectives:
Initially, they were involved in the 
distribution of materials for roofing repairs, etc. through 
church groups. This practice evolved into a longer-term strategy 
of working through rural agricultural groups to promote the 
construction of low cost durable shelter solutions. DDF was 
interested in using the cons truetion ' of houses as a means for (
promoting its development programs and encouraging community 
strength and cooperative viability.
Organ i zat i on:
farmer groups.
Worked in the Bani region with various small
Planning and Coordination:
• PIann i ng:
In the initial emergency phase of DDF's 
disaster relief program, it provided loans of up to RD$2,500 
per beneficiary to repair or rebuild damaged dwellings.
They worked through local church groups and their own small
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farmer associations. Under the AID-financed repair program, 
a materials package maximum amount of RD$400 per unit 
persuaded DDF to work exclusively through its own 
assoc i a t i ons.
• Geographic Location:
Small agricultural communities in the Bani and 
San Cristobal region.
• Bene f i c i ar i es :
477 homes repaired; in the process of this 
number of units, DDF worked through 28 existing small farmer 
associations in 24 communities and served approximately 
3,000 persons through the program.
• Exten t i on i s t s :
The small farmer associations had existing 
administrative capabilities.
• Training and Supervision:
The program provided the technical supervision 
of a "maestro de obra". In addition, each association 
formed a committee responsible for overseeing that repairs 
were carried out on a correct and timely basis. This 
committee submitted monthly reports to the association's 
governing body.
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• Coord i nat i on :
In some of the rural communities, the AID/DDF 
program worked closely with the INVI work brigades in order 
to obtain assistance during the more difficult construction 
s tages.
Program Financing and Accountability:
• Funding Source:
DDF has received $150,000 in grant funds from 
AID. These funds were disbursed in two phases of $50,000 
each .
• Costs Recovered:
DDF distributed the building materials package 
on a credit basis. The costs will be recovered over a 
period not to exceed 15 years at an annual interest rate of 
2 percent.
Program Implementation:
The materials purchased from the donation of 
the AID grant funds were stored in a warehouse in the community 
of Alto de Peravia in Bani. The materials, in turn, were 
distributed to the participating service agencies for 
distribution to the program beneficiaries. The program 
beneficiaries were responsible for supplying the labor component 
of the repair effort.
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6. PVO: Catholic Relief Service (CRS)
Grant Funds: $76,000
Policy Objectives:
CRSTs purpose is to provide financing for low 
cost housing solutions, as well as training and education in the 
construction of wind resistant shelter. CRS made a decision not 
to participate in the housing repair portion of AID'S Emergency 
Housing Program but rather to construct completed units. When it 
finally did join with AID, it was in the production of 84 basic 
core units.
Or gan i z a t i on:
Several agencies are coordinating their 
efforts in the construction of the 84 core units in Arroyo 
Canas. CRS is working directly through Father Quinn's Asociacion 
Para el Desarrollo de San Jose de Ocoa. The President's Office 
is supplying the zinc roofing materials, while INVI is supplying 
the technical support. The whole operation is channeling 
assistance to self-help groups in Arroyo Canas which are 
undertaking the construction.
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Planning and Coordination:
• PIann i ng:
CRS1s scope was to provide the self-help 
groups with building materials and sufficient technical 
support to construct 84 core units which include concrete 
foundations and floors, a concrete block pedastal 
approximately 1 meter in height and sufficient lumber for 
the remaining structure and roof trusses. To assist in the 
construction, salaried master builders would be provided to 
supervise the construction of the work groups. The master 
builders would also teach local masons and carpenters how to 
build hurricane resistant housing using the Intertect 
design.
• Geographic Location:
Arroyo Canas, Province of Peravia.
• Bene f i c i ar i e s :
84 families who lost their homes and land due
to flooding.
• Service Agencies:
CRS is working through the San Jose de Ocoa
As oci ac i on .
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• Training and Supervision:
CRS organized a model construction/training 
course in Sabana Larga for local craftsmen. Those 
participating were given pamphlets showing the weak points 
of traditional construction methods, as well as the 
reconmended improvements. To aid in project construction, 
skilled foremen are being provided to oversee work 
activities. INVI has also provided technical support and 
project supervision. An electric saw and concrete block 
making machine have also been provided. CRS supervises the 
disbursement of funds through the Asociacion.
• Coord i nat i on;
See preceeding section on "Organization." 
Program Financing and Accountability:
• Funding Source:
In addition to AIDTs donation of $76,000, the 
President's Office made an in-kind contribution of zinc 
roofing material. INVI was responsible for supplying a 
revised site plan including drainage facilities and will be 
responsible for supplying the site with water.
• Cost Recovery:
Each family will repay 40 percent of the total 
cost of the building materials over a 2-3 year period.
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Recovered funds are to be used in a manner decided upon by 
the program beneficiaries for the benefit of the entire 
commun i ty.
• Aud its:
The Asociacion must provide CRS with proof of
use of funds.
Program Implementation:
• Materials:
Acquisition and distribution of materials is 
the responsibility of the Asociacion. A workshop/warehouse 
has been erected on-site to store and make building 
components.
• Allotment of Dwelling Units:
The allotment of the 84 units to the selected 
program beneficiaries will be done on the basis of a 
l o t t e r y .
• Materials Package:
The core unit selected is based on a design 
developed by CRS in San Jose de Ocoa. It is a basic core 
house using a base of concrete blocks with wood covering the 
upper half of the structure. The roof is of galvanized 
zinc. An upper limit of RD$600 per unit for materials was 
set by AID.
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• Monitoring of Construction:
See section under "Training and Supervision.
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